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Telecommunications regulatory reform is a recent phenom-
enon in small island developing states, including in five 
Pacific island states in the past five years. Opportunities for 
regulatory capture exist when independent regulators are 
vulnerable to political pressure. There is therefore a case for 
external multilateral policy restraint to deter policymakers 
from reneging on policies. This study estimates the impact of 
the telecommunications commitments of the WTO on a panel 
data set of 160 developing countries (including 26 small island 
developing states) during the period 1995–2006. Preliminary 
evidence is that the credibility of telecommunications reform 
in small island developing states is enhanced via commit-
ments to WTO telecommunications agreements that lock in 
domestic reforms. No evidence was found that signing on 
to bilateral investment treaties enhanced the credibility of 
telecommunications reform in small island developing states.
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Do multilateral policy restraints enhance the 
credibility of telecommunications regula-
tory reforms in small island developing 
states? Telecommunications liberalisation 
is a complex and relatively new process for 
developing countries (Fink, Mattoo and 
Rathindran 2003:444). It is an even more 
recent policy initiative in small island 
developing states. Three Caribbean island 
states—Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago—began such reform in the 
early 2000s (Lodge and Stirton 2002). Five 
Pacific island countries have reformed their 
telecommunications sectors in the past five 
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years. While it is still early days to try to 
capture fully the outcomes of such reforms, 
it is important to account for the selection 
and implementation of key policies during 
the early stages of the regulatory reform 
process.
Telecommunications investment inv-
olves high sunk costs; therefore, reversing 
an investment decision is generally costly 
because the capital, once installed, is 
industry specific and cannot easily be put to 
productive use in a different activity (Serven 
and Solimano 1993:131). When investment 
is irreversible, theory suggests that firms 
will be reluctant to invest (Chirinko and 
Schaller 2009:390).
Pindyck (1988) found that increases in 
uncertainty lowered investment (Caballero, 
Engel and Haltiwanger 1995; Abel and 
Eberly 2002; Guiso and Parigi 1999; Bloom, 
Bond and van Reneen 2007). Low credibility1 
of announced telecommunications reforms 
can create uncertainty for investors. 
Evidence of frequent policy reversals during 
telecommunications reform was found in 
reforming Pacific island countries. In the 
early stages of the process of moving to a more 
competitive environment, governments 
attempt to balance the pressures from the 
incumbent operators and other vested 
interest groups and pressure from the public 
for better-quality services and lower prices. 
The result of these conflicting interests 
is that governments might announce a 
competition policy but over time renege 
on it, which is known in economics as the 
‘time inconsistency problem’ (Kydland and 
Prescott 1977). Regulatory capture by vested 
interests can have the same effect as policy 
reversal (Bo 2006; Helm 2006; Levine and 
Forrence 1990).
A majority of the recent studies on 
telecommunications policy in developing 
countries have focused on three regulatory 
reform policy instruments: privatisation, 
competition and independent regulators 
(Flacher and Jennequin 2008; Fink, Mattoo 
and Rathindran 2003; Wallsten 2003, 2004; 
Li and Xu 2002; Ros 1997).
Scholars have undertaken national 
and cross-national studies on competition 
in the telecommunications sector (Keck 
and Djiofack-Zebaze 2009; Shiu and Lam 
2008; Lam and Shiu 2008; Armstrong and 
Sappington 2006; Lee and Findlay 2005; 
Fink, Mattoo and Rathindran 2003; Wallsten 
2001). The consensus is that there is a 
positive impact on the sector’s performance, 
with higher infrastructure and technological 
investment leading to reductions in prices 
and improvements in the quality of services. 
The role of independent regulators in 
providing credibility and transparency in 
the regulation of telecommunications has 
also been well addressed (Levy and Spiller 
1994; Ros 1997; Melody 1997; Noll 1999; 
Stern and Trillas 2003; Wallsten 2003; Lee 
and Levendis 2006; Bertelli and Whitford 
2009). When independent from political 
pressures, these legal entities oversee 
economic and technical regulation of the 
telecommunications sector for the benefit 
of the public. The literature on institutions 
suggests that when regulatory frameworks 
restrain executive discretion, utility sectors 
tend to experience better performance (Lee 
and Levendis 2006; Wallsten 2001; Baudrier 
2001; Levy and Spiller 1996).
Scholars and policymakers, however, 
continue to debate the effectiveness of 
independent regulators. Melody (1997:195) 
argued that ‘the regulator either lost, or 
never had, the independence to make pro-
fessional decisions on their merits because 
of undue influence either from politicians, 
politically driven Ministries, or the regu-
lated monopolies’. The independence of the 
regulator can be compromised via finan-
cial or political means. Funding of some 
independent regulators is by budgetary 
appropriations passed by parliament. The 
regulator’s board of directors can include 
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insights into the impact of commitments 
to the WTO’s telecommunications agree-
ment (multilateral policy restraint) on the 
credibility of telecommunications reform. 
Second, it provides evidence of telecommu-
nications regulatory reform in small island 
developing states, to which the existing 
literature on telecommunications reform 
gives little attention.
Based on a panel of 160 developing 
countries—including 26 small island 
developing states, and covering the period 
1995–2006—multiple regression analysis is 
used to test the robustness of the impact of 
multilateral policy restraints on the cred-
ibility of telecommunications regulatory 
reforms. This study finds that controlling 
for telecommunications reform policy and 
socio-political, economic and technologi-
cal factors, there is evidence of a positive 
relationship between multilateral policy 
restraint and the credibility of unilateral 
telecommunications regulatory reforms in 
small island developing states. The positive 
relationship is stronger and statistically 
significant for larger developing countries. 
Controlling for the effects of other key exter-
nal policy restraints, there is no statistically 
significant evidence of positive effects for 
small island developing states of participat-
ing in bilateral investment treaties.3
Analytical framework
There are about 60 small island states. 
Due to a lack of the statistical data on tel-
ecommunications and regulatory variables 
required for this study, the sample of small 
island developing states is limited to 26. The 
total number of developing countries in the 
data set is 160. The use of a large number of 
developing countries is important to ensure 
the highest number of observations for the 
study and a good representation of the total 
population (Monroe 2000:68–9).
the prime minister or the minister respon-
sible for telecommunications. The prime 
minister often appoints the commissioner 
(or head) of the independent regulator.
While the independence and autono-
mous decision-making of independent 
regulators are crucial for the credibility 
of policy reforms, regulatory capture can 
provide opportunities for governments to 
renege on previously announced policy 
commitments. Regulatory capture creates 
uncertainty. The outcome of such uncer-
tainty for potential private investors is 
hesitation about investing. Rodrik (1991:230) 
suggests that rational behaviour on the part 
of the private sector calls for withholding 
investment until much of the uncertainty 
regarding the success of the reforms is elimi-
nated. The uncertainty drives up the prices 
of services or the withholding of part of the 
physical investment2 until the investor can 
be sure that a reform policy is irreversible 
(Aryeetey 1994:1,212).
A case can therefore be made for the role 
of external multilateral policy restraints in 
hindering opportunistic regulatory capture 
behaviour. The WTO’s telecommunications 
commitment under the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) provides a fixed 
rule that is relatively immune from domestic 
politics. Effectively, WTO telecommunica-
tions commitments provide a ‘lock-in’ 
mechanism to consolidate governments’ 
unilateral reform initiatives. Buthe and 
Milner (2008:742) argue that ‘unilateral 
domestic policy choices can often be easily 
changed; instead a government can make 
a more credible commitment regarding 
present and future economic policies by 
entering into international agreements that 
commit its country to the liberal economic 
policies that are seen as desirable for foreign 
investors’.
This article contributes to the litera-
ture on telecommunications reform with 
respect to two key issues. First, it provides 
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Two restraint policies (multilateral and 
domestic) are employed to proxy for the 
credibility of unilateral telecommunications 
reform. Restraint policies were tested on 
their own to account for their respective 
effects on the 160 developing countries. 
This approach crosschecks the research’s 
findings against the literature. To ensure 
the best description of the island dummy, 
two approaches were adopted. First, a 
dummy variable for islands was included to 
proxy the 26 small island developing states. 
Second, the restraint policies were interacted 
with the island dummy to isolate any spuri-
ous effects the island dummy might have 
picked up due to other factors.
Relationships involving the two restraint 
policies were tested using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and generalised least squares 
(GLS) methods. The use of simple OLS was 
to address outliers within the data set, given 
that economic, social, political and insti-
tutional characteristics of the developing 
countries within the data set were large. The 
use of GLS effectively controls for country-
wise heteroscedasticity4 (Fink, Mattoo and 
Rathindran 2003:453). 
Fink, Mattoo and Rathindran (2003) 
argued that the presence of heteroscedas-
ticity could be explained by differing 
government initiatives in liberalising the 
sector under different political regimes. The 
use of GLS to correct for heteroscedasticity 
makes the estimation far more efficient 
than ordinary fixed-effects panel estimation 
(Baltangi 1995, cited in Fink, Mattoo and 
Rathindran 2003:453).
Data collection and variable 
definition
Plagued by a lack of, out-of-date or conflict-
ing data, studying small island developing 
states is a challenge for empirical research. 
In recent years, however, improvements in 
the availability of statistics have led to some 
progress—most notably, the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators, the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union’s World’s 
ICT Indicators 2007 and the World Bank’s 
(online) Good Governance Indicators have 
made several useful policy and economic 
data sets available for time-series analysis.
Data collection
This study updated and revised an earlier 
panel data set on telecommunications policy 
and regulation compiled by the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
and the World Bank in 2003. Fink, Mattoo 
and Rathindran (2003) used the data set for 
analysis of 86 developing countries for the 
period 1985–99. The data set covered key 
indicators of telecommunications regula-
tions, market structures and the presence 
of an independent regulator.
The data set was expanded for the 
period 1995–2006. Updates of key telecom-
munications variables were sourced from 
the ITU (2006, 2007) and World Bank (2006). 
Missing observations were sourced from 
government web sites, telecommunications 
operators and national telecommunications 
regulatory authorities. Other economic, 
institutional, technological, social and 
geographic variables were sourced online 
from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the Commonwealth Secretariat, Freedom 
House, the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and 
The Fraser Institute.5
Of the 26 small island developing 
states in the sample, 15 had established 
independent regulatory bodies to oversee 
the regulatory and implementation aspects 
of the telecommunications sector by 2007. 
Nine island states have signed telecom-
munications commitments under the WTO 
framework, while 16 have signed on to 
one or more bilateral investment treaties. 
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Twenty-one island states had introduced 
competition into the telecommunications 
sector as of 2008. The key policy character-
istics of the 26 small island developing states 
are outlined (Table 1).
Variable definitions
This analysis used the following dependent, 
independent and control variables (Table 2).
Dependent variables
The credibility level of telecommunications 
regulatory reform is the dependent variable. 
The credibility level is roughly measured by 
telecommunications sector performance. If 
the regulatory reform process is credible, we 
should see better telecommunications sector 
performance and vice versa. The study 
adopts similar variables to those used in the 
earlier study by Fink, Mattoo and Rathin-
dran (2003). Sector performance is proxied 
Figure 1 Residuals of performance variables (examining heteroscedasticity)
Performance variable 1
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          +----------------------------------------------------------------+
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via internal (productive) efficiency within 
operators and allocative efficiency across 
the whole sector.6 Productive efficiency 
(Performance Variable 1) is proxied by the 
total number of subscribers per employee. 
This measure provides a limited indicator of 
the internal efficiency of rendering quality 
services to subscribers. We therefore expect 
that a higher number of subscribers per 
employee roughly indicates that efficiency 
is higher.
Allocative efficiency (Performance 
Variable 2) is measured by a crude, com-
monly used measure—namely, the total 
number of fixed and mobile subscribers 
per 100 people. This ratio roughly indicates 
the network allocations for expansion 
throughout a country. We would therefore 
expect that a higher ratio indicates a higher 
resource allocation to network expansion 
and investment. The use of this measure 
ensures that the majority of the telecom-
munications sector’s activity is accurately 
reflected. Added-value services were not 
included due to the acute lack of up-to-date 
and consistent country data, particularly for 
small island developing states.
Obviously, these two performance vari-
ables have limitations, which Fink, Mattoo 
and Rathindran (2003:445) have touched on. 
Nevertheless, the two proxies are available 
as time series for a large number of countries. 
Fink, Mattoo and Rathindran (2003) used 86 
developing countries for the period 1985–99, 
while this study included 160 developing 
countries for the period 1995–2006.
By no means do the two performance 
indicators mirror performance.7 Pair-wise 
correlations between the two credible 
policies and the two performance vari-
ables indicate that Performance Variable 1 
(0.41 for multilateral restraint and 0.34 for 
domestic restraint) denotes higher pair-wise 
correlations of the two variables.8 The analy-
ses therefore emphasise the OLS and GLS 
estimates for Performance Variable 1 while 
using Performance Variable 2 estimates to 
crosscheck the results.
Independent variables
The hypothesised explanation for the varied 
performance of the telecommunications 
sectors is the use of multilateral policy 
restraints. Multilateral policy restraints 
impose regulatory restraints that limit the 
policy discretion of policymakers, thereby 
establishing a credible policy environment 
for investment and performance. While 
independent regulators have been used 
to establish credible telecommunications 
reform, through the WTO’s telecommu-
nications commitments, governments can 
provide a more credible reform policy than 
the domestic regulator. Independent regu-
lators are subject to domestic legislation, 
which can be amended by policymakers 
if there are sufficient incentives. A multi-
lateral commitment that is legally binding 
is difficult to ignore. A variable indicating 
that the country has signed on to a bilat-
eral investment treaty (BIT) is included as 
another control variable since it is also an 
international treaty obligation.
A commitment to the WTO’s tele-
communications agreement by member 
countries since 19979 is indicated by inclu-
sion of a dummy variable for which 1 = 
country made a commitment and 0 = no 
commitment (Keck and Djiofack-Zebaze 
2009:11; Buthe and Milner 2008:748). 
Countries that are not WTO members or are 
currently undergoing the accession process 
are marked with ‘no commitment’. Informa-
tion on years of commitment was sourced 
online from the WTO (http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/
telecom_e.htm). When controlling for the 
effects of islands, multilateral restraint 
policy was interacted with the islands 
dummy (Multilateral Restraint*Islands).
To account for the effects of other influ-
ences, five categories of control variables 
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were included—domestic telecommu-
nications reform policy, bilateral policy 
restraints, socio-political development, 
economic and technological development, 
and geography.
Domestic policy restraint is a measure 
of the impact of domestic regulatory 
institutions on telecommunications sector 
performance. Domestic credibility is real-
ised when governments create independent 
entities to regulate and implement tel-
ecommunications policies outside the 
government’s policymaking boundaries. 
The dummy for the establishment of an 
independent regulator therefore has a value 
of 1, while the existence of a regulator that 
is not independent has a value of zero, as in 
Maiorano and Stern (2007:169). The variable 
is a proxy for ‘strong country institutions 
(i.e. that could commit credibility level 
to a given policy)’ (Maiorano and Stern 
2007:168). Information on the independence 
of regulators was drawn from Fink, Mattoo 
and Rathindran (2003) and updated based 
on the ITU’s online sources and the online 
sources of regulators. The results for domes-
tic policy restraints are compared with those 
for multilateral policy restraints. To control 
for the effects of small island developing 
states, the domestic policy restraint vari-
able is interacted with the islands dummy 
(Domestic Restraint*Islands).
The introduction of competition in 
the telecommunications sector is another 
important control variable for telecom-
munications regulatory reforms. The choice 
of this particular reform policy is based on 
the fact that it has consistently been found 
to influence strongly and positively the 
telecommunications sector’s performance 
(Fink, Mattoo and Rathindran 2003:443–66; 
Maiorano and Stern 2007:165–81; Armstrong 
and Sappington 2006:325–66). The competi-
tion dummy is 1 = introduced competition 
in the telecommunications sector and 0 = 
otherwise. The competition variable reflects 
competition in mobile and/or fixed-line 
services. The objective is to control for any 
effects of introduced competition. While 
privatisation is an equally important 
reform measure, most developing countries 
have not fully reformed their incumbent 
operators through 100 per cent private 
ownership. Competition is therefore pres-
ently the most influential reform policy and 
therefore the most appropriate indicator for 
telecommunications regulatory reform in 
small island developing states. Further, the 
experience with telecommunications reform 
in the Pacific shows that the introduction 
of competition has been the major policy 
focus while privatisation seems to be less 
forthcoming.
To control for bilateral policy restraints 
on performance, the cumulative number of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) signed 
by a country at the end of a given year 
(Buthe and Milner 2008:748) was chosen 
as the control variable. The use of cumula-
tive numbers reflects the signalling effect 
of bilateral investment treaties for a safe 
investment environment (Kim 2006; Tobin 
and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Neumayer and 
Spess 2005). The log of the total number 
of bilateral investment treaties signed 
was taken to normalise the data set. The 
information on bilateral investment trea-
ties was sourced online from UNCTAD 
(‘UNCTAD Investment Instruments Online’, 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Doc-
Search____779.aspx). When controlling for 
the effects of islands, the bilateral restraint 
policy variable is interacted with the islands 
dummy (Bilateral Restraint*Islands).
Two socio-political indicators were 
included—first, whether telecommunica-
tions sector performance was influenced 
by domestic interest group lobbying. 
The square root of urban population as a 
percentage of total population is used as 
a measure of interest group pressure on 
telecommunications infrastructure deploy-
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ment. The more urbanised a country, the 
higher are the pressures from interest 
groups for telecommunications reform (Li, 
Qiang and Xu 2005:1,309; Henisz and Zelner 
2006:266–8).
Second, the extent of corruption is taken 
as a proxy for institutional quality. It is 
well documented that corruption reduces 
foreign direct investment (Wei 2000; Cuervo-
Cazurra 2006; Kaufmann 1997). Moreover, 
corruption results in the inefficient alloca-
tion of resources towards areas that are 
most prone to bribes (Mauro 1998, cited in 
Cuervo-Cazurra 2006:808). A ‘freedom from 
corruption’ indicator was sourced online 
from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom (http://www.heritage.
org/Index/Default.aspx).10 The Index of 
Economic Freedom is constructed from 10 
‘freedoms’ including freedom from corrup-
tion. The freedom from corruption index is 
derived from Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index. The Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index is scaled so that a 
score of 10 indicates very little corruption 
and a score of 1 indicates a very corrupt 
government. The freedom from corruption 
index also adopts this scaling; however, the 
raw Corruption Perceptions Index data are 
multiplied by 10 to obtain the freedom from 
corruption score (Beach and Kane 2008:52). 
This study reverted to the original Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index score and, to avoid 
confusion on reading the regression coeffi-
cients, the corruption measure was recoded11 
such that a high corruption index number 
meant little corruption and vice versa.
Two economic control variables were 
included. First, the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita (constant US$2000) was 
used as a measure of economic performance 
(as in Maiorano and Stern 2007; Cubbin 
and Stern 2006; Estache, Goicoechea and 
Manacorda 2006; Waverman, Meschi and 
Fuss 2005). Second, the natural logarithm of 
total population per country was included 
to control for country size (Frankel and 
Romer 1999).
It is argued that ‘geography’ negatively 
affects the economic development of coun-
tries.12 Nearly all countries geographically 
located 23 degrees north and south of the 
equator are poor, while almost all countries 
in the higher latitudes are rich (Gallup, 
Sachs and Mellinger 1999:180; Sachs 2001:1). 
The ‘cursed’ tropical regions are often 
disadvantaged by distance from major 
markets, scarcity of natural resources and 
high transportation costs due to populations 
being concentrated inland rather than on 
the coast (including landlocked countries). 
Sachs (2001:10–19) argues that geography 
negatively affects labour productivity 
through tropical infectious diseases, low soil 
fertility for farming (due to heavy precipita-
tion), large numbers of tropical pests and 
diseases that affect farming systems and 
acute shortages of water for agriculture.
Almost all 26 small island developing 
states in the sample are located in the tropics. 
‘Geography’ is quantified by the absolute 
latitudinal location of capital cities from 
the equator (Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebbi 2004). The technological nature of the 
telecommunications sector does, however, 
alleviate some of the geographic challenges 
of  small island developing states, given 
that the regulatory policies ensure universal 
access throughout the islands.
In addition, an island dummy variable 
is included for small island developing 
states, with 1 = island and 0 = otherwise. 
This is a necessary control variable for 
‘islandness’. To isolate any spurious effects, 
the island dummy variable might pick up 
in the regressions on the data set for the 160 
developing countries, an interaction vari-
able between the islands dummy variable 
and the main predictor policy variable is 
also included.
Technological development is a key 
ingredient for the development and effec-
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tiveness of telecommunications services. 
It is therefore crucial to control for tech-
nological development in the estimates. A 
time dummy is included to account for the 
effects of technological developments and 
diffusion in the telecommunications sector 
(as in Maiorano and Stern 2007; Fink, Mattoo 
and Rathindran 2003). It is expected that its 
effect will be positive and strong.
Empirical results
The relationships between multilateral and 
domestic restraint policies and telecom-
munications sector performance is first 
checked through the use of simple scatter 
plots/kernel density graphs. There are cor-
relations between restraint policies and the 
two performance variables (Figure 1). The 
multilateral and domestic restraints are best 
depicted using kernel density graphs since 
both indicators are dummy variables. There 
is a noticeable difference between the means 
when the multilateral restraint policy (x) is 
not present (mean (y | x = 0)) compared with 
when it is present (mean (y | x = 1)).13  The 
kernel density graph for domestic restraint 
policy shows similar positive correlations 
with the performance variables when 
domestic restraint policy is present.
One noticeable difference in the pair-
wise correlations between the two sets of 
independent variables (multilateral and 
domestic policy restraints) and the two 
performance variables is that the two sets 
of independent variables are highly cor-
related with Performance Variable 1, as 
shown by the distinct difference of the two 
(dotted and solid) lines. On the other hand, 
the pair-wise correlations between the two 
sets of credibility policies and Performance 
Variable 2 are much weaker, as shown by 
the slight difference between the two lines. 
This suggests that Performance Variable 
1 reflects sector performance better than 
Performance Variable 2. 
The simple multiple OLS and GLS 
estimates for the two performance variables 
are shown (Table 3). Columns 1 and 2 show 
the regression estimates on Performance 
Variable 1, while Columns 3 and 4 show 
the regression results on Performance 
Variable 2.
The multilateral policy restraint coeffi-
cient is consistently positive and statistically 
significant across robust OLS and GLS 
estimates in Performance Variable 1 (0.17 
and 0.17) and Performance Variable 2 (0.27 
and 0.22). In comparison, the coefficients 
on the domestic restraint policy variable14 
are positive and significant but weaker 
(0.14 and 0.16 for Performance Variable 
1; 0.19 and 0.15 for Performance Variable 
2). As expected, the WTO’s multilateral 
agreements, with their legal obligations, 
strengthen telecommunications reforms 
by locking in policies. The coefficient 
estimates for the domestic policy restraints 
suggest that although independent national 
regulatory bodies might be established, 
regulatory capture can compromise their 
effectiveness.
As expected, bilateral investment trea-
ties positively influence the performance of 
telecommunications sectors in developing 
countries. This result is in line with the 
literature on the positive impact of bilat-
eral investment treaties on foreign direct 
investment inflows. While the bilateral 
policy restraint variables have statistically 
significant regression coefficients for both 
performance variables, they are, however, 
lower than for the other two restraint 
variables (0.08 and 0.10 for Performance 
Variable 1; 0.16 and 0.18 for Performance 
Variable 2).
Examination of the main explanatory 
variables shows two important results. 
First, there is a strong positive relationship 
between the external policy restraints—WTO 
commitments and bilateral investment trea-
ties adopted by developing countries—and 
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Table 3 OLS and GLS regression results (160 developing countries)
Performance variable 1 Performance variable 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS GLS OLS GLS 
Multilateral restraint 0.17 ***
(0.04)
0.17 ***
(6.61)
0.27 ***
(0.04)
0.22 ***
(8.60)
Domestic restraint 0.14 ***
(0.04)
0.16 ***
(6.32)
0.19 ***
(0.06)
0.15 ***
(5.88)
Bilateral restraint 0.08**
(0.02)
0.10 ***
(7.43)
0.16 ***
(0.02)
0.18 ***
(11.74)
Multilateral restraint*islands 0.19
(0.12)
0.13 
(1.53)
0.56 ***
(0.18)
0.53 ***
(4.90)
Domestic restraint*islands 0.11 
(0.13)
0.03 
(0.37)
–0.18 
(0.20)
–0.22 **
(–2.11)
Bilateral restraint*islands –0.18 *** 
(0.05)
–0.13 ***
(–3.05)
–0.42 *** 
(0.09)
–0.36 *** 
(0.05)
Competition 0.25 ***
(0.04)
0.21 ***
(7.83)
0.05
(0.05)
0.04 *
(1.77)
Corruption free 0.17 ***
(0.05)
0.16 ***
(5.52)
0.16 **
(0.06)
0.18 ***
(4.92)
Interest group pressure 0.03 ** 
(0.01)
0.04 ***
(4.57)
0.15 ***
(0.02)
0.15 ***
(13.33)
Population 0.06 ***
(0.00)
0.05 ***
(9.31)
–0.03 **
 (0.01)
2.47 ***
(0.27)
GDPPC 0.39 ***
(0.02)
0.37 *** 
(23.40)
0.64 ***
(0.02)
0.49 ***
(0.11)
Geography –0.51 ***
(0.12)
–0.60 ***
(–8.38)
1.95 ***
(0.11)
1.95 ***
(26.85)
Islands 0.05 
(0.10)
0.03
(0.39)
1.24 ***
(0.17)
1.14 ***
(11.95)
Constant –0.23 
(0.26)
–0.01 
(–0.09)
–3.08 ***
(0.31)
–4.45 ***
(–23.65)
Wald Chi-squared n.a. 7,637.80 n.a. 18,278.26
Observations 1,051 1,051 1,223 1,223
Adjusted R-squared 0.72 .. 0.81 ..
VIF (mean) 2.84 .. 2.49 ..
* significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant at 1 per cent 
Notes: Time dummy is not reported. Robust standard errors in columns 1 and 3 in parentheses; GLS corrected 
z-statistics in columns 2 and 4 in parentheses. 
Sources: Panel data set compiled from World Bank, 2003. World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 
Washington, DC; ITU online sources and respective governments data sources.
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their telecommunications sector perform-
ance under competition. Second, the impact 
of endogenous policy restraints (establish-
ing an independent regulator) is diminished 
(as reflected by the regression coefficient ‘r’) 
when the two external policy restraints are 
added to the model. These results suggest 
that external policy restraints can play an 
important role in establishing credibility.
The estimated coefficients of the other 
control variables are fairly robust, as 
indicated by the statistical significance 
across the OLS and GLS estimates. The 
telecommunications reform policy indica-
tor (competition) is positive (0.25 and 0.21 
for Performance Variable 1; 0.05 and 0.04 
for Performance Variable 2) and mostly 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
This result supports the idea that unilateral 
introduction of competition policy spurs the 
overall performance of the sector.
Socio-political variables (corruption 
free and interest group pressure) have 
positive relationships with performance. 
Freedom from corruption—an indicator of 
the integrity of governments—has positive 
and statistically significant coefficients 
in both sets of equations (0.17 and 0.16 
for Performance Variable 1; 0.16 and 0.18 
for Performance Variable 2). This result 
aligns with the literature on corruption 
and investment: lower corruption leads to 
higher foreign direct investment. Similarly, 
the interest group pressure variable had 
positive and statistically significant results 
(0.03 and 0.04 for Performance Variable 
1; 0.15 and 0.15 for Performance Variable 
2)—all statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level. This result is in line with research 
on the impact of interest group pressure 
on telecommunications infrastructure 
deployment.
The economic control variable (GDPPC) 
is positive and statistically significant (0.39 
and 0.37 for Performance Variable 1; 0.64 
and 0.49 for Performance Variable 2). The 
high regression coefficients, compared 
with most other variables in the model, are 
understandable, as income and sustainable 
economic activities generally determine 
private telecommunications operators’ 
investment strategies. Population (as a 
proxy for country size) is also positive and 
statistically significant (Performance Vari-
able 1, 0.06 and 0.05), suggesting economies 
of scale. As expected, the proxy variable 
for technological development, the time 
dummy (1.36 and 1.25 for Performance 
Variable 1 and 0.25 and 0.18 for Perform-
ance Variable 2), is positive and statistically 
significant in GLS estimates for both of the 
performance variables.
As expected, ‘geography’ has a negative 
relationship with performance (–0.51 and 
–0.60 for Performance Variable 1). Isolated, 
small islands with mountainous landscapes 
might not provide commercial incentives for 
private investment.
Given the natural challenges of small 
island states, one is always suspicious of 
regression results from studies including 
larger-scale developing countries. Many of 
these quantitative studies seldom do justice 
to the special circumstances of small island 
developing states and how they can affect 
the regression estimates. Understandably, 
the lack of data on small island developing 
states means that many are excluded from 
empirical studies. With the necessary data 
available to include 26 small island develop-
ing states in the database, it was possible to 
test the credibility of telecommunications 
policies in small island developing states 
via the interaction terms. The regression 
estimates show coefficients on islands 
interacted-policy variables.
The islands interacted policy variables 
show positive regression coefficients for the 
two performance variables (Performance 
Variable 1 = 0.19 and 0.13; Performance Vari-
able 2 = 0.56 and 0.53). The coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. 
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Figure 2 Bivariate correlations K-density/scatterplot graphs, 160 developing countries
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The OLS and GLS coefficient estimates for 
the islands interacted with the multilateral 
restraint variable are higher than for the 
islands interacted by the domestic restraint 
variable (0.11 and 0.03 for Performance 
Variable 1; –0.18 and –0.22 for Performance 
Variable 2).
The coefficients on the islands inter-
acted with the policy variables are roughly 
similar to the results for the policy restraint 
variables for the 160 developing countries. 
As expected, the results show positive rela-
tionships between the multilateral policy 
restraints and the credibility of unilateral 
telecommunications reforms in small island 
developing states. In the case of domestic 
policy restraints, the islands interaction 
variables have positive but weak coefficients 
at best. Again, this reaffirms the limited 
credibility that domestic policy restraint 
can provide.
Robustness checks
With respect to the significance of the statisti-
cal estimates, two issues are worthy of note. 
First, given the F-test results, we can reject 
the null hypothesis that the effects of the 
independent variables did not happen by 
chance. Also, OLS equations explain a high 
percentage of the variation of Performance 
Variable 1 (adjusted-R2 = 0.72) and Perform-
ance Variable 2 (adjusted-R2 = 0.81). Second, 
multi-collinearity is of minimal concern, as 
shown by the low variance inflation factors 
(VIF) of the OLS estimates—from 1.27 to 4.08 
(mean VIF = 2.46) for Performance Variable 
1, and from 1.25 to 3.95 (mean VIF = 2.58) for 
Performance Variable 2. As a general rule, an 
individual VIF level of more than 10 requires 
attention (Der and Everitt 2002:85; Szmrec-
sanyi 2006:215; Castillo 2007:146–7).
Controlling for ‘islandness’—which 
effectively reduces the number of observa-
tions in the sample from 160 to 29—comes 
with some statistical challenges. The total 
number of observations potentially avail-
able for an empirical study of small island 
developing states is quite low (60 micro-
states, half of which are non-sovereign 
states—either territories or colonies of 
industrialised economies). The relatively 
small number of island states within the 
data set can be considered as outliers. 
Further, only nine small island developing 
states of the 160 developing countries made 
commitments to the WTO, and 15 of the 
160 established independent regulators. 
Therefore, the relative impact of such small 
numbers in the sample could be minute.
Conclusion
The findings of this study provide important 
policy implications for small island develop-
ing states and international institutions. 
Investments in the telecommunications 
sector are sensitive to policy uncertainties 
due to their high sunk costs, the politically 
sensitive nature of the sector and the non-
transferability of the assets. The credibility 
of the regulatory reform program is therefore 
of utmost importance. This article provides 
preliminary support for the idea that mul-
tilateral policy restraint provides credibility 
to unilateral telecommunications reforms in 
small island developing states.
The coefficient estimates from the analy-
sis of 160 developing countries, including 26 
small island developing states, show that 
multilateral policy restraints provide higher 
credibility for telecommunications sector 
regulatory reform than domestic restraints 
and being a signatory to bilateral investment 
treaties. Commitment to the WTO agree-
ment on telecommunications—as a proxy 
for multilateral policy restraints—appears 
to provide the credibility that investors 
require. The legally binding nature of the 
multilateral trading treaty signals a more 
predictable and transparent investment 
environment. Although bilateral investment 
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14 The regression coefficients for the main 
predictor, including the other two policy 
restraints, were standardised for easy 
comparison. The standardised beta weights 
(not reported) indicate that multilateral 
restraint consistently has the strongest 
contribution compared with the other two 
policy restraints.
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